A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy

Jean-Robert Tyran and Rupert Sausgruber

University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen

Abstract: We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment, and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.

Keywords: Fairness; Voting; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D63 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2002-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:dp2002:2002-30

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