Supervision and Effort in an Intertemporal Efficiency Wage Model: The Role of the Solow Condition

Joao Ricardo Faria ()

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: The Solow condition is examined in an intertemporal model that blends the shirking and the turnover models of efficiency wages with managerial supervision. It is shown that the Solow condition does not hold when shirking and turnover costs are considered. The Solow condition can be a possible outcome when managerial productivity offsets shirking and turnover costs.

Keywords: Labour-Management Relations; Efficiency Wages; Unemployment; Turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J50 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08
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Published in Economic Letters, 2000, 67, pp.93-98

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