Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence

Yoram Halevy and Michael Peters ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: The Ultimatum Game seems to be the ideal experiment to test for the structure of preferences or the sequential rationality assumptions underlying subgame perfection. We study the theoretical implications of introducing the possibility of misconceptions - that actions may potentially affect continuation payoffs - and show that the set of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria does not converge to the subgame perfect equilibrium when the possibility of misconception approaches zero. The perfect equilibria studied corresponds qualitatively to the experimental findings of offers made and unfair offers rejected.

Keywords: ulitmatum game; asymmetric information; interdependent preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-03-31, Revised 2009-06-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-07-03-31-11-46-48

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