Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment

Stefania Bortolotti, Giovanna Devetag and Andreas Ortmann

No 901, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: We report results from a weak-link � often also called minimum-effort � game experiment with multiple Pareto-ranked strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria, using a real-effort rather than a chosen-effort task: subjects have to sort and count coins and their payoff depends on the worst performance in the group. While in the initial rounds our subjects typically coordinate on inefficient outcomes, almost 80 percent of the groups are able to overcome coordination failure in the later rounds. Our results are in stark contrast to results typically reported in the literature.

Keywords: real effort; weak-link game; coordination; laboratory experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:0901

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