The Structure of Japan's Financial Regulation and Supervision and the Role Played by the Bank of Japan
Kazuo Ueda ()
No CIRJE-F-703, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
Abstract:
In this short note, I will explain the structure of Japan's financial regulation and supervision and discuss by way of examples the structure's weaknesses and strengths. In doing so, I pay particular attention to the role played by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The paper focuses mostly on the period since the late 1980s when Japan saw the formation of land and stock price bubbles, their burst and serious negative effects on the financial system and the economy. I argue that, despite a streamlined structure of financial regulation, monetary authorities' response was not quite optimal and discuss possible reasons for the sub-optimal behaviors. I also point out that there are significant synergies between monetary policy and prudence policy at central banks, but that such synergies are not fully exploited.
Pages: 18pages
Date: 2009-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2009/2009cf703.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: The Structure of Japan's Financial Regulation and Supervision and the Role Played by the Bank of Japan (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2009cf703
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CIRJE administrative office ().