Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?

No 18-083/VIII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.

Keywords: Cartel games; Coalition formation; Common Pool Resources; Support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180083

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