International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game

Bjart Holtsmark and Dag Einar Sommervoll ()
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Dag Einar Sommervoll: Statistics Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/ansatte

Discussion Papers from Statistics Norway, Research Department

Abstract: Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

Keywords: Climate change; international environmental agreements; emissions trading; non-cooperative game theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q2 Q4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-res
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