Anreizsysteme als Instrument des Beteiligungscontrolling in Venture-Capital-Gesellschaften

Kathryn Viemann () and Martin Hibbeln ()

Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, 2006, vol. 17, issue 3, 322 pages

Abstract: In the context of the principal-agent theory, some problems are highlighted that exist in the financing relationship between venture capital firms and start-up firms. These problems can be reduced or even eliminated by using incentive systems, which are an instrument of investment-controlling. After explaining the components of incentive systems and the requirements in general, it is checked whether different designs of incentive systems, with respect to the practical relevance, fulfill the requirements and can thus be used effectively as an instrument of investment-controlling. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s00187-006-0005-9

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