Imitation and selective matching in reputational games

Thierry Vignolo ()

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2010, vol. 20, issue 3, 395-412

Keywords: Reputation; Long-run equilibria; Selective matching; Games with an outside option; C72; C73; L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games (2007)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-009-0156-6

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