Tax Competition, Imperfect Capital Mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

No 804, Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agree- ments (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of re- location of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of capital tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and di¤er only in their cost of relocation.

Keywords: Tax Competition; Capital Mobility; Non-Preferential Regime. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F21 H26 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ftp1.economics.smu.edu/WorkingPapers/2008/Kishore/Kishore-2008-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:smu:ecowpa:0804

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, P.O. Box 750496, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ömer Özak ().