Market Power Effects on Worker-Employer Network Formation in Evolutionary Labor Markets with Adaptive Search

No 543, Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This study reports on market power experiments for an agent-based computational model of a labor market. Workers and employers repeatedly choose and refuse worksite partners on the basis of continually updated expected returns, engage in worksite interactions modelled as two-person games, and evolve their worksite strategies over time. Three treatment factors affecting the relative market power of workers and employers are experimentally varied: market structure (two-sided, partially fluid, and endogenous type markets); market concentration (ratio of workers to employers); and market capacity (ratio of potential work offers to potential job openings). Particular attention is focused on experimentally determined correlations between market power and the formation of contractual networks among workers and employers, and between contractual network formation and the types of worksite interactions and welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support.

Date: 1999-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/evlab.ps main text (application/postscript)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf9:543

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 from Society for Computational Economics CEF99, Boston College, Department of Economics, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().