Unemployment Insurance and the Evolution of Worker-Employer\n Cooperation: Experiments with Real and Artificial Agents

Mark Pingle and Leigh Tesfatsion
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mark Pingle () and Leigh Tesfatsion ()

No 279, Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This paper reports the results of human subject and computational experiments designed to examine how the level of the "inactivity payments" to workers and to employers affects the evolution of cooperation among workers and employers. The related impacts to unemployment and job vacancy rates are our primary focus. However, we also examine the impacts on labor force participation, productive efficiency, the willingness to form long term relationships, and other outcome measures.

Keywords: Agent-based computational economics; Labor market; Unemployment\n benefits; Evolution of cooperation; Adaptive search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 C9 J2 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf1:279

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