Refined Risk Assessment and Banking Stability
Hans Gersbach and
Jan Wenzelburger ()
Working Papers from ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design
Abstract:
Current banking regulatory frameworks are based on the belief that refined assessment of credit risks improves banking stability. This paper investigates this claim in a general setting by comparing a simple banking system with a sophisticated banking system which is capable of assessing default risks of entrepreneurs more accurately. By charging actuarially fair loan-interest rates, the sophisticated system finances fewer entrepreneurs. Relative to the simple system, both their repayments and liabilities are lower. Expected aggregate profits of entrepreneurs are higher but consumers receive lower deposit rates. Refined risk assessment may increase the systemic default risk of a banking system if bank equity is too low. Requiring higher bank equity ratios and forcing banks to refine their risk assessment techniques tend to increase stability if taken together, but may not be successful if only the latter is implemented. We draw implications for the policy debate, sparked by the financial crisis.
Keywords: financial intermediation; macroeconomic risks; risk assessment; risk premiums; banking regulation; rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://web.sg.ethz.ch/RePEc/stz/wpaper/pdf/ETH-RC-13-005.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server web.sg.ethz.ch: A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:stz:wpaper:eth-rc-13-005
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Claudio J. Tessone ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).