Relative Injustice Aversion

Luis José Blas Moreno-Garrido ()
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Luis José Blas Moreno-Garrido: Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica, Postal: Apartado de correos 99, Ctra. San Vicente s/n, 03080 Alicante, Spain

No 13-4, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: I propose a new utility function based on the relative aversion to injustice to explain why, in classical bargaining games, classical equilibria do not hold when money is not windfall, but it is result of the e ffort.

Keywords: Distribution; Equity; Justice; Altruism; Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D63 D64 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-08-02, Revised 2015-07-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_004

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