Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser ()

No 201, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2011-06-30, Revised 2011-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-mic
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