Walk The Line: Conflict, State Capacity And The Political Dynamics Of Reform

Sharun Mukand, Sanjay Jain and Sumon Majumdar ()

No 1288, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms in developing countries. First, we demonstrate that economic reforms that are proceeding successfully may run into a political impasse, with the reformÂ’s initial success having a negative impact on its political sustainability. Second, we demonstrate that greater state capacity to make compensatory transfers to those adversely affected by reform, need not always help the political sustainability of reform, but can also hinder it. Finally, we argue that in ethnically divided societies, economic reform may be completed not despite ethnic conflict, but because of it.

Keywords: Economic reform; State capacity; Politics; Redistribution; Compensation; Ethnic Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O20 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1288.pdf First version 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform (2014)
Working Paper: Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform (2014)
Working Paper: Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform (2013)
Working Paper: Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1288

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