Incomplete information and R&D organization

Srobonti Chattopadhyay and Tarun Kabiraj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research under incomplete information when the R&D outcome is stochastic and continuously distributed with a given mean and a constant variance. We show that the non-cooperative R&D incentive increases with the variance of the R&D outcome. And this result does not depend on the nature of the product market competition.

Keywords: Cooperative R&D; non-cooperative R&D; incomplete information; variance of the research outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete information and R&D organization (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:59205

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