Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets

Semih Koray and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.

Keywords: Bayesian Implementation; Nash Implementation; Asymmetric Information; Oligopoly; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D82 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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