Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency's preferred mode of provision depends on the information gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and on the degree to which effort is contractible.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships; Integration versus separation; Information gathering; Incomplete contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 H11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ino and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (2013)
Working Paper: Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:41966

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