Modelo de Unión Público-Privado: una aproximación desde la Teoría de Contratos

Public Private-Partnership: an approach from contract theory

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the adjudication of several stages of an infrastructure project to develop a public service, when there is only private participation, there are strong incentives to reduce costs over the life of the project, which may affect the quality of service. In this paper, after a model extension to Hart (2003), is evaluated in more detail the advantages of the concession model, considering different classes of property in its implementation and introducing a simple mechanism to renegotiate, concluding that participation government is not justified for their ability to make innovations in quality, but because it is a mechanism to internalize the costs and benefits that may result in investment to reduce cost by the private party.

Keywords: Teoría de contratos; Unión Público Privado; Privatización (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L24 L33 O31 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32038

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