Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Martin Kocher, Peter Martinsson, Kristian Ove R. Myrseth and Conny Wollbrant

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control. As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models.

Keywords: self-control; cooperation; public good; risk; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2017)
Working Paper: Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2017)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2013)
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