Bribes and Business Tax Evasion

David Joulfaian ()

European Journal of Comparative Economics, 2009, vol. 6, issue 2, 227-244

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of governance, in particular bribes to tax officials, in shaping business tax compliance behavior in transition economies. The empirical results show that business noncompliance rises with the frequency of tax related bribes. More specifically, the findings from 27 economies suggest that tax evasion thrives when bribes to tax officials are commonplace. These findings are robust to a number of specifications that control for firm and country attributes as well as address the potential endogeneity of bribes.

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Firm Behavior; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H25 H26 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liu:liucej:v:6:y:2009:i:2:p:227-244

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