A theory of regional conflict complexes
Arthur Silve and
Thierry Verdier
Cahiers de recherche from Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques
Abstract:
Civil conflicts spill over into neighboring countries. This paper proposes a theory of the contagion of civil wars. Weak territorial control facilitates the emergence of a regional market for war inputs in the “porous frontier.” The contagion effect is nonlinear and creates multiple equilibrium situations of regional complexes of civil conflicts. This helps explain the observed patterns of regional clustering of conflict and institutional quality, and raises identification issues in the measurement of the contagion effect. We also derive a positive spillover of civil wars: governments are sometimes in a position to avoid contagion by improving their institutions. Finally, we explore the policy implications for military intervention, and military and institutional cooperation.
Keywords: civil war; contagion; porous frontier; institutions; military intervention; institutional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N40 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1805
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