Is the behavior of fishers rational under Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) regimes? An Experimental Approach

Keisaku Higashida, Kenta Tanaka and Shunsuke Managi

No 73, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: Marine resource depletion is a critical concern for humankind. Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) regimes are among the most effective measures to tackle this problem. Employing an experimental approach, this study examines the rationality of fishers under an ITQ regime. In particular, this study focuses on the case where fishers can change their own vessel scales in the beginning of each period in each experiment. We find that the higher the quota price is, the more irrationally fishers behave. Moreover, vessel scales and initial allocations can influence the rationality of fishers.

Keywords: Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs); experiment; rational behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2011-08, Revised 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:73

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