Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries

Cristina Bodea ()

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 155, issue 1, 107 pages

Abstract: This article analyzes the effect of central bank independence on fiscal deficits. Previous literature finds a negative relationship between bank independence and deficits in OECD countries. No such relationship is found for developing countries. We argue that independent and conservative central bankers prefer budget discipline due to the long run connection between deficits and inflation and can enforce their preference through interest rate hikes and refusal to lend to the government. The claim, however, is that the legislated independent status of the central bank is cheap talk in the absence of democratic institutions. We test empirically the conditional effect of central bank independence on a sample of 23 democratic and undemocratic post-communist countries from 1990 to 2002. Results show that independent central banks restrain budget deficits only in democracies. Also, democracies that have not granted independence to their central banks have the worst fiscal discipline. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Fiscal budget deficit; Independent central bank; Regime type; Post-communist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9843-6

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