To What Extent do Latin Americans Trust and Cooperate? Field Experiments on Social Exclusion In Six Latin American Countries
Alberto Chong,
Hugo Ñopo and
Juan-Camilo Cardenas
No 4577, Research Department Publications from Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
Abstract:
This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate and pool risk by using a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, the voluntary contributions mechanism and the risk pooling game; applied in six capital cities in Latin America. The results suggest that: (i) on average, the propensity to trust and cooperate among Latin Americans is remarkably similar to that found in other regions of the world; (ii) expectations about the behavior of other players are the main driver of trust, reciprocity and cooperation; and (iii) behaviors involving socialization, trust and cooperation are closely interconnected.
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=W ... e_name=pubWP-635.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-635&pub_file_name=pubWP-635.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-635&pub_file_name=pubWP-635.pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: To What Extent do Latin Americans Trust and Cooperate?: Field Experiments on Social Exclusion In Six Latin American Countries (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:wpaper:4577
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Department Publications from Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Felipe Herrera Library ().