On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining

Robert Feicht (), Veronika Grimm (), Holger A. Rau () and Gesine Stephan
Additional contact information
Robert Feicht: Public Administration of Bavaria
Veronika Grimm: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Holger A. Rau: University of Göttingen

No 9506, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.

Keywords: multi person ultimatum game; dictator game; collective decisions; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C92 J31 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published - revised version published in: European Economic Review, 2017, 100, 175-192.

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Working Paper: On the Impact of Quotas and Decision Rules in Ultimatum Collective Bargaining (2015)
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