A Model of Dynamic Conflict in Ethnocracies

Dripto Bakshi () and Indraneel Dasgupta ()
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Dripto Bakshi: Indian Statistical Institute

No 9159, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence over institutions, which partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. Results suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict.

Keywords: ethnocracy; ethnic conflict; dynamic contest; rent-seeking; inter-temporal productivity carryover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O10 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Defence and Peace Economics, 2018, 29 (2), 147-170

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Journal Article: A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies (2018)
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