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Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature

Pierre Chiappori and Olivier Donni

No 4603, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.

Keywords: testability; strategic model; collective model; households; identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D13 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72 pages
Date: 2009-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

Published - published in: Alberto Molina (ed.), Household Economic Behaviors, Berlin: Springer, 2011, 1 - 40.

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Working Paper: Nonunitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature (2011)
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