Reciprocal Climate Negotiators: Balancing Anger against Even More Anger

No 17/2014, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: I explore possible impacts of reciprocal preferences on participation in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal countries condition their willingness to abate on others' abatement. No participation is always stable. A full or majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Reciprocity; Coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2014_017

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