Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?

Anna Meyer () and Mårten Wallette ()
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Anna Meyer: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden, http://www.nek.lu.se/en/contact

No 2005:15, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: According to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.

Keywords: Temporary jobs; signals; absenteeism; overtime; exit; competing risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J40 J69 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2005-02-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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