Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Martin Kocher, Peter Martinsson, Kristian Ove R. Myrseth () and Conny Wollbrant
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Kristian Ove R. Myrseth: ESMT European School of Technology and Management, Postal: Schlossplatz 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany

No 523, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires self-control effort. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

Keywords: self-control; cooperation; public good; risk; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2012-01-18, Revised 2013-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/28337 (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2017)
Working Paper: Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2017)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas (2013)
Working Paper: Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas (2012)
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