Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations

Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland
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Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon [Eugene]

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Abstract: This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as farsightedly stable.

Keywords: Farsighted stable sets; Heterogeneous expectations; One-to-one matching; Voting; Effectivity functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, 121, pp.32-54. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations (2020)
Working Paper: Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations (2020)
Working Paper: Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations (2017)
Working Paper: Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02973406

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001

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