Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This article analyses the effectiveness of a system of job search monitoring system. Such a system leads the unemployed workers to reduce their wage requirements what results in a fall of the wages and in consequence of the unemployment rate. This article shows that a rise of the unemployment benefit can reduce the unemployment rate if the penalty imposed in the event of job refusal corresponds to a suppression of the allowances. However a stronger wage moderation can be problematic. This system encourages the workers indeed to accept quickly jobs that are not very productive. Because the composition of jobs also changes, total output and welfare would decrease as well. Finally, what is gained on the quantitative level is lost on the qualitative level.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; monitoring; productivity; quality of jobs; Assurance chômage; contrôle; sanction; productivité; qualité des emplois (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00113481
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Published in 2005

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Working Paper: Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00113481

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