Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach

David Lowing and Makoto Yokoo ()
Additional contact information
Makoto Yokoo: Kyushu University

Abstract: A Sharing value for transferable utility games distributes the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the players in the coalition's support. Such distribution is done according to a certain sharing system that determines the Sharing value. In this paper, we extend Sharing values to multi-choice games. Multi-choice games are a generalization of transferable utility games in which players have several activity levels. Unlike in transferable utility games, there is no straightforward way to interpret the support of a coalition in a multi-choice game. This makes it more tedious to distribute the Harsanyi dividend of a multi-choice coalition. We consider three possible interpretations of the support of a multi-choice coalition. Based on these interpretations, we derive three families of Sharing values for multi-choice games. To conduct this study, we discuss novel and classical axioms for multi-choice games. This allows us to provide an axiomatic foundation for each of these families of values.

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Sharing values; Harsanyi set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04018735
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-04018735/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04018735

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().