Optimal liquidation in dark poolsPeter Kratz and Torsten Schöneborn No 2011-058, SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk Abstract: We consider a large trader seeking to liquidate a portfolio using both a transparent trading venue and a dark pool. Our model captures the price impact of trading in transparent traditional venues as well as the execution uncertainty of trading in a dark pool. The unique optimal execution strategy uses both venues continuously. The order size in the dark pool can over- or underrepresent the portfolio size depending on adverse selection and the correlation structure of the assets in the portfolio. Introduction a dark pool results in delayed trading at the traditional venue. The appeal of the dark pool is increased by liquidity but reduced by adverse selection. By pushing up prices at the traditional venue and parallel selling in the dark pool, a trader might generate profits; we provide sufficient conditions to rule out such profitable price manipulation strategies. Keywords: dark pools; optimal liquidation; adverse selection; market microstructure; illiquid markets (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2011-058 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.