The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects

Alexey Savvateev (), Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber ()
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Michel Le Breton: Université de Toulouse I, GREMAQ and IDEI

No 2005.39, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.

Keywords: Jurisdictions; Stable partitions; Public projects; Egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Working Paper: The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects (2005)
Working Paper: The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in the Provision of Public Projects (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.39

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