The impact of maximum markup regulation on prices
Christos Genakos (),
Pantelis Koutroumpis and
Mario Pagliero
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
Markup regulation is a common yet understudied type of regulation. We analyze the repeal of maximum wholesale and retail markup regulation in an oligopolistic and vertically non-integrated market. By comparing the prices of products affected by regulation before and after the policy change and using unregulated products as a control group, we find that abolishing regulation led to a significant decrease in both retail and wholesale prices. The results provide indirect but consistent evidence that markup ceilings provided a focal point for collusion among wholesalers.
Keywords: markups; markup regulation; policy evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L0 L1 L4 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60533/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices (2018)
Working Paper: The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices (2014)
Working Paper: The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices (2014)
Working Paper: The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices (2014)
Working Paper: The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:60533
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