A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ludwig Ensthaler and Thomas Giebe

Research Policy, 2014, vol. 43, issue 1, 179-189

Abstract: This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability and limitations. Moreover, we highlight connections to recent advances in computer science.

Keywords: Research; Subsidies; Auctions; Procurement; Budget (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D44 D45 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733313001157
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:respol:v:43:y:2014:i:1:p:179-189

DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2013.06.011

Access Statistics for this article

Research Policy is currently edited by M. Bell, B. Martin, W.E. Steinmueller, A. Arora, M. Callon, M. Kenney, S. Kuhlmann, Keun Lee and F. Murray

More articles in Research Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().