The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths

Bang Dang Nguyen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen

Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, vol. 98, issue 3, 550-567

Abstract: We investigate contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to sudden deaths in the US from 1994 to 2007. We find, first, that following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average. Second, the degree of independence and board structure determine the marginal value of independent directors. Third, independence is more valuable in crucial board functions. Finally, controlling for director-invariant heterogeneity using a fixed effect approach, we identify the value of independence over and above the value of individual skills and competences. Overall, our results suggest that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.

Keywords: Independent; director; Sudden; death; Board; of; directors; Corporate; governance; Firm; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (186)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:98:y:2010:i:3:p:550-567

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