Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

Yannick Gabuthy, Nicolas Jacquemet () and Nadège Marchand ()

European Economic Review, 2008, vol. 52, issue 2, 259-282

Abstract: This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:52:y:2008:i:2:p:259-282

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