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Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors

Martin Acht, Toman Omar Mahmoud and Rainer Thiele
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Toman Barsbai

Journal of Development Economics, 2015, vol. 114, issue C, 20-33

Abstract: A core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received. Donor countries may still give aid to poorly-governed countries because of a dilemma they face: those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions. This paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non-state actors. Using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non-state channels and considering different dimensions of governance, we provide evidence that bypassing governments via NGOs and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions. The effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels, and weaker for higher levels of economic self-interest among donors.

Keywords: Aid allocation; Aid channels; Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:114:y:2015:i:c:p:20-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.005

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