Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

Joanna Poyago-Theotoky and Ben Ferrett

No 2012-51, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a horizontal agreement always arises. The insiders' merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o : While merger o ers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a pro t-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (\quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.

Keywords: horizontal merger; research joint venture (RJV); contract enforceability; process R&D; R&D complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV (2016)
Working Paper: Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV (2012)
Working Paper: Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV (2012)
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