Heterogeneous Decision-Making and Market Power

Levent Kutlu, Robin Sickles and Mike Tsionas

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a structural model wherein the decision-makers are payoff maximizers in a general game theoretic setting in which heterogeneity is formally factored into the decisions of the players. The decision-makers are allowed to have different types; and parameters are the same within each type but they differ across types. Using insights from our treatment of heterogeneous and strategic decision-making, we estimate the conducts (market powers) of Eurozone banks for years 2002-2015. We find that Eurozone banks are fairly competitive. However, banks in peripheral countries have more market power compared to the core of Eurozone.

JEL-codes: C11 C18 D24 D40 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:19-008

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