Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

No 05-20.RS, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.

Keywords: Trust game; Trustworthiness; Reciprocity; Inequality; Social capital. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D63 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published by: ULB, DULBEA

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/13628/1/dul-0092.pdf dul-0092 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game (2007)
Working Paper: Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dul:wpaper:05-20rs

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... ulb.ac.be:2013/13628

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().