Tax Morale, Slippery-Slope Framework and Tax Compliance: A Cross-section Analysis

Gabriele Ruiu and Gaetano Lisi

No 2011-05, Working Papers from Universita' di Cassino, Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza

Abstract: Following two important strands of tax compliance literature, this empirical paper develops a cross-section analysis in order to test both the role of tax morale on tax compliance decisions and the main predictions of the slippery slope framework. Using data from the World Value Surveys (WWS), we find empirical support for the slippery slope framework, since trust in and power of tax authorities are negatively and significantly related to a proxy for tax non-compliance behavior given by the size of the hidden economy. In particular, trust in tax authorities exerts a larger effect on shadow economy than the power of tax authorities. Instead, the relation between tax morale and our proxy for tax evasion is not statistically significant.

JEL-codes: A13 C31 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2011-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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