Bycatch ITQ Management in Oligopolistic Fisheries

Jean-Christophe Pereau and Nicolas Sanz

No 2011-05, Documents de Travail from CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system implemented on bycatch on the global harvest level of oligopolistic fisheries. We show that the impact of changes in the total allowable catch (TAC) on the equilibrium harvest level depends on the degree of returns to scale in harvest. In particular, a reduction in the TAC may lead to a rise in activity in fisheries characterized by some amount of increasing returns to scale. Besides, these effects appear to be stronger, the fiercer the competition within fisheries.

Keywords: oligopolistic competition; fisheries; bycatch; ITQs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 Q21 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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