Anti-Social Behavior in Profit and Nonprofit Organizations

Emmanuelle Auriol and Stefanie Brilon

No 9009, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: "good" workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas "bad" workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. While missionoriented organizations take advantage of the intrinsic motivation of good workers, they are more vulnerable than profit-oriented organizations to anti-social behavior: bad workers only join them to behave badly. To prevent this, monitoring has to go up in the mission-oriented sector, while the incentives for good behavior stay the same. In the profit-oriented sector, by contrast, both monitoring and bonus payments for good behavior increase to control the damage caused by bad workers. As a result, in equilibrium bad workers are generally working in the for-profit sector where they behave like "normal" people, while good workers self select into the mission-oriented sector.

Keywords: Motivated agents; Non-profit; Sabotage; Candidate selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Anti-social behavior in profit and nonprofit organizations (2014)
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