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Governance and Growth

Mark Gradstein ()

No 3270, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Because of its inappropriability, protection of property rights is widely recognized as being the state?s responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that it leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. Nevertheless, the extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. This Paper endogenizes the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), we present a model where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other. Depending on initial conditions, the economy can converge to a high-income or a low-income steady state. The existing empirical evidence seems to offer a tentative support for this theory.

Keywords: Enforcement of property rights; Economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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