Wars, Taxation and Representation: Evidence from Five Centuries of German History

Luigi Pascali, Sascha Becker, Andreas Ferrara and Eric Melander

No 15601, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We provide causal evidence for the role of conflicts in the development of representative institutions in Europe. Using novel data on the universe of German cities between 1250 and 1710, we show that involvement in wars resulted in city councils that were larger, had a higher probability of being elected by citizens, and a higher probability of guild representation. Additionally, conflicts led to a substantial long-term increase in local fiscal and spending capacity. This effect persisted well after the end of the conflicts: temporary war taxes were transformed into permanent sophisticated systems of taxation, while public spending was re-directed from military to civilian spending. We use the gender of the firstborn child of the best-connected local noble to instrument for conflict: a firstborn daughter increases the likelihood of conflict relative to a firstborn son.

Keywords: Wars; Institutions; Medieval constitutionalism; Fiscal capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N13 P48 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-his and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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